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This paper is about grading on a curve. Following the grading scheme deﬁnition of Becker
and Rosen (1992), grading on a curve, or relative grading, means that teachers assess student
performance relative to the performance of their classmates.1 In contrast, absolute grading
means that teachers grade student performance based on speciﬁc learning criteria, which
typically are set by the individual teacher.2 Teacher-assigned grades, which are intended
to provide information about students’ knowledge and skills of a speciﬁc subject, are a
relevant educational outcome. Labor market entry and educational career might depend
on school grades, rather than on (typically unobservable) test scores—a frequently studied
outcome in the economics of education literature (see Hanushek (2002) and Hanushek and
Woessmann (2011) for overviews). For example, school grades contained in résumés might be
an important productivity signal of individuals entering the labor market because employers
must assess the quality of their applicants with limited information from résumés, personal
interviews, and references. Indeed, employers have been shown to discriminate among
workers on the basis of easily observable characteristics that are correlated with productivity,
such as years of schooling or educational attainment: at the beginning of the labor market
career, wages are strongly related to years of schooling, while they are not related to
unobservable cognitive ability (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). Furthermore, school grades might
aﬀect the educational career if, for example, the secondary school track choice depends on
the grades obtained in primary school (like in Germany). Besides students’ ability, students’
learning eﬀort, and teachers’ grading standards3, it is the grading scheme of the teacher
that greatly determine students’ school grades. Moreover, theoretical work suggests that the
grading scheme can aﬀect students’ learning eﬀort (see Landeras, 2009; Bishop, 1999).
In this paper, we provide causal evidence of the incidence of relative grading (as opposed
to absolute grading). Employing a within-student across-subject approach allows elimi-
nating unobservable school-, teacher-, and student-level characteristics that may confound
the results of existing studies on this topic. We identify teachers’ grading scheme using
1Throughout the paper, the terms "grading on a curve" and "relative grading" are used interchangeably.
2Relative grading, for example, means that the best 10 percent of students in the classroom receive the
best grade, the next 10 percent receive the second-best grade, and so on. Under an absolute grading scheme,
to receive a certain grade, a student must pass a threshold score, or absolute standard, that has been set by
the teacher in advance. For example, in a test with a maximum of 100 points, teachers assign the best grade
for [100,91] points, the second-best grade for [90,81] points, and so on.
3Empirical studies consistently show that high grading standards—that is, teachers assigning relatively
low grades for given performance levels—have large positive eﬀects on student achievement (see Figlio and
Lucas, 2004; Betts, 1995; Betts and Grogger, 2003; Bonesrønning, 1999, 2004).
1data from the German extension of the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
(PIRLS-E) 2001, which contains both test scores and teacher-assigned grades in reading and
math for fourth-grade students. Given the deﬁnition above, teachers grade on a curve if a
student earns a lower grade in the subject in which her classmates’ performance is relatively
better, holding constant the student’s own performance.4 One could estimate the association
between a student’s grade and her classmates’ performance, controlling for the student’s
own performance, in an OLS model with a sample that pools data from the two subjects.
However, the resulting coeﬃcient on classmates’ performance might suﬀer from bias due to
unobserved student and teacher characteristics as well as non-random sorting into schools
and classrooms. Such biases occur, for example, when able teachers elicit better student
performance but also have higher grading standards (see Figlio and Lucas, 2004), or when
principals assign teachers with high grading standards to classrooms with low-performing
students. To overcome these potential biases, we restrict the sample to students who have
been taught both subjects by the same teacher and diﬀerence both grades and test scores
across the two subjects reading and math. First-diﬀerencing across subjects eliminates all
unobserved student-speciﬁc and teacher-speciﬁc factors that do not diﬀer between subjects.
This approach identiﬁes the impact of classmates’ academic performance on a student’s grade
in the same subject.5 In addition, using a correlated random eﬀects model, we verify the
validity of the overidentiﬁcation restriction of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model, that the impact
of classmates’ performance on a student’s grade is the same in both subjects. Finally, we
provide ﬁrst descriptive evidence on the relationship between relative grading and students’
learning eﬀort, measured by students’ participation in class.
Our main results show that having classmates with one standard deviation higher average
test scores lowers a student’s grade by about 10 percent of a standard deviation, given his or
her own performance. The eﬀect size is very similar for alternative measures of classmates’
performance, such as the median value or the student’s rank in the performance distribution
of the class. We ﬁnd that only female teachers, but not male teachers grade on a curve.
Exploiting the diﬀerence in grading schemes across teacher gender, we ﬁnd that relative
4Note that our setting diﬀers from the traditional peer eﬀects literature. In our model, we include a student’s
performance as an explanatory variable, whereas peer eﬀects models estimate the eﬀect of classmates’
performance on a student’s performance. More intuitively, we estimate the eﬀect of classmates’ performance
on an individual student’s grade after peers may already have aﬀected the student’s performance.
5The empirical strategy follows Metzler and Woessmann (2010), who estimate the eﬀect of teacher subject
knowledge on student achievement in reading and math, extending the approach of Dee (2005, 2007), who
uses variation across diﬀerent teachers to analyze the eﬀects of teacher characteristics that do not vary across
subjects.
2grading is not related to lower students’ learning eﬀort: students’ eﬀort, as measured by
students’ participation in class, is very similar in classes with female teachers and in classes
with male teachers. Even though this ﬁnding might suﬀer from bias due to unobservable
gender-speciﬁc teacher characteristics, it is in contrast with theoretical reasoning that relative
grading provides an incentive for lower average class performance because all students will
receive the same grades at less eﬀort (see Bishop, 1999).
To date, the empirical incidence of relative grading has mainly been studied by pedagog-
ical scholars and psychologists, who consistently ﬁnd that classmates’ average test scores are
signiﬁcantly negatively related to a student’s grade in the same subject, controlling for the
student’s own test score. Based on this ﬁnding, the authors conclude that teachers grade
on a curve (see Milek et al., 2009; Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007). However, these studies
exploit variation in classmates’ performance across teachers, classrooms, and even schools.
Thus, the resulting estimates might suﬀer from biases due to unobserved student and teacher
characteristics and non-random sorting into schools and classrooms.
Even if relative grading and absolute grading have the same impact on students’ learning
eﬀort, as suggested by our descriptive results, teachers’ grading schemes are important for
other reasons. Grades—and not unobservable test scores—are likely to be relevant for
the educational career of an individual. In several German states, for example, the grade
point average (GPA) in German and math at the end of primary school—exactly what we
observe in our data—has a considerable impact on the secondary school track choice (see
Kropf et al., 2010). The latter, in turn, strongly determines the ﬁnal school degree and
has long-lasting eﬀects on access to tertiary education and future labor market outcomes
(Dustmann, 2004). Moreover, grades are crucial academic outcomes if a student’s GPA
must be above a certain threshold to progress to the next grade or to graduate from school.
Likewise, admission to post-secondary institutions might be selective and based on the GPA
received in secondary school. Furthermore, systematic diﬀerences in the way teachers assess
students’ academic performance also raise a fairness issue that should be of interest for policy
makers: students whose teachers grade relatively (female teachers) are assessed with respect
to their classmates’ performance, whereas students whose teachers grade absolutely (male
teachers) receive grades that are independent of the performance of their classmates, given
the students’ own performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
school system and teacher grading in Germany. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy
3and Section 4 presents the student dataset and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows results
from OLS and ﬁrst-diﬀerenced models and discusses eﬀect heterogeneity. In Section 6,
we provide descriptive evidence on the association between teachers’ grading scheme and
student’s learning eﬀort. Section 7 concludes.
2 The German School System and Teacher Grading
In Germany, children start school in the year after they turn six and attend four grades
in primary school (Grundschule).6 At about age 10, students are allocated to one of three
types of secondary school which diﬀer by both duration and curriculum. Basic schools
(Hauptschule) provide basic general education and lead to a certiﬁcate after grade 9.7
Middle schools (Realschule) provide a more extensive general education and last six years.
High schools (Gymnasium) oﬀer the most academic curriculum and cover nine grades. A
lower-level certiﬁcate can be obtained after eight years (Fachhochschulreife) that qualiﬁes
students to attend a polytechnic (Fachhochschule). Basic schools and middle schools are
more vocational-oriented. High schools are the only type of secondary school that provide
direct entry into tertiary education. The high school leaving certiﬁcate (Abitur) is a prereq-
uisite for attending university or other institutions of higher education.
Parents’ decision as to their child’s secondary school track is to a large extent based
on a recommendation by primary school teachers. At the end of primary school, students
do not take ability tests, which could provide information as to their academic potential,
nor are there any centralized examinations, which could facilitate secondary school track
decisions. Instead, primary school teachers recommend a secondary school track for each
student. This recommendation is mostly based on the student’s grades in the two major
subjects German and math. The grades in these subjects are primarily based on the results of
written exams taken during the school year and graded by the teacher. However, a student’s
class participation typically also contributes to the ﬁnal grade in a subject. Importantly,
note that educational authorities do not instruct teachers on how they should grade student
performance. Therefore, teachers in Germany are free to grade either relatively or absolutely.
6In two states, Brandenburg and Berlin, primary school lasts six years.
7There are no basic schools in the eastern states of the former German Democratic Republic. In some
states, an additional fourth school type—comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule)—oﬀers all lower and upper
secondary education levels. Where comprehensive schools exist, only a minor fraction of students attends
this school type. See Lohmar and Eckhardt (2010) for a more detailed description of the German school
system.
4The GPA-based secondary school recommendations are binding in some, but not all,
German states. School authorities usually deﬁne a cutoﬀ for the average grade in German
and math that students must achieve to receive a recommendation for a certain secondary
school track.8 In states where the recommendation is not binding, parents are free to choose
the child’s secondary school track. However, parents are likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by
their children’s grades when making this decision, leading to a very strong correspondence
between teacher recommendation and the secondary school track actually chosen. For all
states, both those with binding and non-binding teacher recommendations, the secondary
school track chosen by the parents coincides with the teacher recommendation 83 percent of
the time (see Pietsch and Stubbe, 2007).
Changing secondary school type is possible in theory, but very rare in practice (see
Jürges and Schneider, 2007). Therefore, the secondary school track decision is a crucial
point in a student’s educational career since it strongly determines his or her ﬁnal school
degree, which, in turn, aﬀects post-secondary education opportunities and future earnings
(Dustmann, 2004). Moreover, the track choice aﬀects the formation of cognitive skills:
students in high schools accumulate more skills than students in basic schools (during the
same time) due to a more beneﬁcial learning environment and a more demanding curriculum
(Baumert et al., 2009).
3 The Within-Student Across-Subject Model
Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that the students in our sample are taught by the
same teacher in both German and math:
yig = ¯1 ¤ S
(¡i)
g + ®1 ¤ Sig + ±1 ¤ Xig + °1 ¤ Zi + µ1 ¤ Tt + ¹i + ¿t + ²ig + ½tg (1)
yim = ¯2 ¤ S
(¡i)
m + ®2 ¤ Sim + ±1 ¤ Xim + °1 ¤ Zi + µ1 ¤ Tt + ¹i + ¿t + ²im + ½tm (2)
The dependent variables yig and yim are the teacher-assigned grades of student i in
German and math, respectively. We model grades as the outcomes of a set of diﬀerent inputs:
8School grades in Germany range from 1 (very good) to 6 (fail). Students in Baden-Württemberg and
Saxony, for example, need an average grade of 2.5 in German and math to receive a recommendation for





m are the average actual performance (measured by PIRLS test scores)9 of
student i’s classmates in reading and math, the determinant we are most interested in.10 Sig
and Sim represent student i’s performance in reading and math. Xig and Xim are observable
subject-speciﬁc characteristics of student i that aﬀect grades. Zi is a vector of observable
subject-invariant characteristics of student i. Apart from student i’s own characteristics,
several teacher-speciﬁc characteristics might aﬀect students’ grades. Restricting our sample
to classrooms taught by the same teacher in both subjects, Tt captures all observable teacher
characteristics (such as gender, age, and experience), which do not diﬀer across subjects. The
error term contains the following components: ¹i and ¿t represent unobservable student-
and teacher-speciﬁc factors that are identical across subjects; ²ig and ²im are subject-speciﬁc
student inﬂuences; and ½tg and ½tm are unobservable subject-speciﬁc teacher terms.
A straightforward way of identifying the eﬀect of student i’s classmates’ performance
on student i’s grades would be diﬀerencing Equations (1) and (2), thereby eliminating
confounding unobservable subject-invariant student and teacher characteristics.11 However,
this implicitly assumes that ¯1 = ¯2, that is, classmates’ performance aﬀects the grade of
student i in German the same way it does in math. This means in our context that the
strength of relative grading is the same for both subjects.
Building on the work of Chamberlain (1982), several studies test this assumption by
estimating a correlated random eﬀects model (see, for example, Ashenfelter and Krueger,
1994; Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997; Metzler and Woessmann, 2010). We follow this
approach and model the subject-invariant student- and teacher-speciﬁc error terms ¹i and










m +®3¤Sig +®3¤Sim+±3¤Xim+±3¤Xig +°3¤Zi+µ3¤Tt+¾i (4)
9While the school subject is called German, the PIRLS data contain students’ performance in reading. We
assume that this performance measure also reﬂects students’ writing skills since the PIRLS score is based
on written answers.
10In other speciﬁcations, we replace classmates’ average performance by other measures of classmates’
performance, such as the median test score or the rank of student i in the classroom’s performance
distribution.
11Note that including student and teacher ﬁxed eﬀects yields the same results as ﬁrst-diﬀerencing across
the two subjects. Identiﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects across subjects was ﬁrst introduced by Dee (2005, 2007),
who estimates the eﬀect of student-teacher demographic matches and student-teacher gender interactions
on student outcomes.
6Equations (3) and (4) represent the correlation of ¹i and ¿t with observable student and
teacher characteristics. Student-subject-speciﬁc characteristics for both subjects appear in
both equations. Only the ´ and Ã coeﬃcients are allowed to vary across subjects. Student
i’s test scores Sig and Sim and all other subject-speciﬁc variables are assumed to have the
same inﬂuence on ¹i and ¿t, respectively. Plugging Equations (3) and (4) into Equations (1)
and (2) yields:
yig =(¯1 + ´1 + Ã1) ¤ S
(¡i)
g + (´2 + Ã2) ¤ S
(¡i)
m + (®1 + ®2 + ®3) ¤ Sig + (®2 + ®3)¤
¤ Sim + (±1 + ±2 + ±3) ¤ Xig + (±2 + ±3) ¤ Xim + (°1 + °2 + °3) ¤ Zi+
+ (µ1 + µ2 + µ3) ¤ Tt + ²ig + ½tg + !i + ¾i
(5)
yim =(¯2 + ´2 + Ã2) ¤ S
(¡i)
m + (´1 + Ã1) ¤ S
(¡i)
g + (®1 + ®2 + ®3) ¤ Sim + (®2 + ®3)¤
¤ Sig + (±1 + ±2 + ±3) ¤ Xim + (±2 + ±3) ¤ Xig + (°1 + °2 + °3) ¤ Zi+
+ (µ1 + µ2 + µ3) ¤ Tt + ²im + ½tm + !i + ¾i
(6)
In these models, ¯1 and ¯2 are selection-corrected eﬀects of classmates’ performance in
the two subjects (see Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994, p. 1162). The terms ´1+Ã1 and ´2+Ã2
reﬂect the bias due to unobserved subject-invariant student and teacher characteristics. Such
biases arise, for example, in OLS models that relate individual grades to classmates’ average
performance and to a set of additional control variables (as in existing studies on relative
grading; see Milek et al. 2009 and Trautwein and Baeriswyl 2007).
Given the assumption of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model that ¯1 = ¯2, the model of Equations
(5) and (6) is overidentiﬁed since there are two reduced-form parameters to estimate (¯1
and ¯2), but only one structural parameter of interest, ¯ (see Ashenfelter and Zimmerman,
1997, p. 2). This allows us to test the overidentiﬁcation restriction implicitly integrated in
that model, that is, we test whether ¯1 = ¯2. Moreover, we can test whether ´1 = ´2 and
Ã1 = Ã2, which tells us whether biases in standard OLS models due to unobserved teacher
and student characteristics are identical in both subjects. If these conditions hold, ¯1 and
¯2 can be replaced by ¯, ´1 and ´2 by ´ and Ã1 and Ã2 by Ã to obtain:
yig =(¯ + ´ + Ã) ¤ S
(¡i)
g + (´ + Ã) ¤ S
(¡i)
m + (®1 + ®2 + ®3) ¤ Sig + (®2 + ®3) ¤ Sim+
+ (±1 + ±2 + ±3) ¤ Xig + (±2 + ±3) ¤ Xim + (°1 + °2 + °3) ¤ Zi + (µ1 + µ2 + µ3)¤
¤ Tt + ²ig + ½tg + !i + ¾i
(7)
7yim =(¯ + ´ + Ã) ¤ S
(¡i)
m + (´ + Ã) ¤ S
(¡i)
g + (®1 + ®2 + ®3) ¤ Sim + (®2 + ®3) ¤ Sig+
+ (±1 + ±2 + ±3) ¤ Xim + (±2 + ±3) ¤ Xig + (°1 + °2 + °3) ¤ Zi + (µ1 + µ2 + µ3)¤
¤ Tt + ²im + ½tm + !i + ¾i
(8)
Equations (7) and (8) allow us to identify the parameter of interest (¯), which is the
diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient on classmates’ performance in the same subject (¯+´+Ã)
and the coeﬃcient on classmates’ performance in the other subject (´+Ã). Again, ´ + Ã
represents the bias due to unobserved subject-invariant student and teacher eﬀects that might
plague OLS models. Since the restricted correlated random eﬀects model of Equations (7)







The results of the overidentiﬁcation test are valid only if we assume that the unobserved
subject-speciﬁc student and teacher factors, (²ig, ²im) and (½tg, ½tm), are random. In
other words: if unobserved subject-speciﬁc student or teacher characteristics are correlated
with classmates’ performance, ¯ cannot be identiﬁed in Equation (9). In this case, the
overidentiﬁcation test from the unrestricted correlated random eﬀects model of Equations
(5) and (6) is not informative either.
Potential threats to the randomness of the unobserved subject-speciﬁc student and teacher
factors could arise from several sources. Metzler and Woessmann (2010), for example, provide
evidence that teachers’ subject-speciﬁc knowledge positively aﬀects students’ test scores. If
we assume, for example, that teachers who are better in math are also more demanding in
this subject, in the sense of stricter grading standards, our identiﬁcation would be hampered:
instead of only identifying teachers’ grading schemes, ¯ would also reﬂect teachers’ grading
standards. Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, Figlio and Lucas (2004,
p. 1820) ﬁnd that U.S. teachers of fourth-grade students have similar grading standards in
reading and math, thus providing evidence against a potential bias due to subject-speciﬁc
grading standards.
Subject-speciﬁc diﬀerences in student motivation could be another reason why the coeﬃ-
cient of interest might be biased in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model. Given her own performance,
a student might be less motivated in the subject in which her classmates’ perform quite
well. If students’ school grades are also aﬀected by motivation and not only by performance,
8¯ would be biased. In some speciﬁcations, we take into account students’ subject-speciﬁc
motivation with an indicator for participation in German and math. Our results are robust
to the inclusion of this additional control variable.
4 Data on German Fourth-Grade Students from PIRLS
For our empirical analysis, we use data from the German extension of the Progress in Interna-
tional Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS-E) 2001. The international PIRLS was initiated and
organized by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(IEA), an independent international cooperative of national research institutions and govern-
mental research agencies.12 The objective of PIRLS is to study trends in reading achievement
for fourth-grade students (9 and 10 year olds). While students from all 16 German states
participated in the international reading assessment on the ﬁrst day of testing, 12 German
states expanded the international study (PIRLS-E) by using a national questionnaire and
testing students in math and science during a second day of testing.13 Importantly, the
knowledge and skills tested in PIRLS-E are signiﬁcant goals in the curriculum of fourth-grade
students in Germany (Bos et al., 2004, p. 16). The target population of fourth graders is
particularly interesting in the German context because the test takes place while students
are in the last grade of primary school, that is, when grades are decisive for the students’
secondary school track choice.
In addition to the objective measures of student performance in German and math (i.e.,
the PIRLS test scores in reading and math), the dataset also contains the teacher-assigned
grades in the two subjects German and math. The grades are reported by the teachers and
refer to the grades assigned to the students in the mid-year report card of the fourth grade.14
PIRLS-E also contains a measure of students’ cognitive ability and extensive information on
student characteristics and family background.15 The cognitive ability measure (Kognitiver
Fähigkeitstest, KFT) should, however, not be interpreted as a measure of invariant, innate
12See Mullis et al. (2003) for a description and results of the international study.
13The four states that did not participate in the math test (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania,
Lower Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt) were excluded from the sample.
14Although PIRLS-E also provides test scores and grades in science, we limit our analysis to the subjects
German and math since these are the major subjects in primary school and because secondary school
recommendations are largely based on grades in these two subjects.
15We use multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) to impute missing values of family background
characteristics. This approach provides valid inferences under the assumption that data are missing at
random.
9ability, but as a measure that reﬂects both innate ability and cognitive abilities accumulated
through education (Heller and Perleth, 2000, p. 54).
Our identiﬁcation strategy requires that students are taught both German and math
by the same teacher. Since the dataset does not contain an explicit teacher ID, we use
three teacher characteristics—gender, age (in years), and teaching experience (in years)—to
determine whether a classroom has the same teacher in both subjects. We exclude any
classroom for which one of these three characteristics diﬀers across German and math
teachers. Furthermore, few students were dropped from the sample because the grade was
missing for one or both subjects.16
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the estimation sample consisting of 2,550 students
from 129 classrooms and 81 schools. Individual test scores and school grades are standardized
to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Classmates’ average test scores is the
simple average of all test scores in the class, excluding a student’s own test score. We rescaled
all grades linearly such that higher values represent better grades, now ranging from 1 (fail)
to 6 (very good). 36 percent of the students received a recommendation for high school, the
most academic secondary school track. 79 percent of the students were born in Germany
and 89 percent speak always or almost always German at home. The majority of teachers
(77 percent) are female, which is typical for German primary schools.17 On average, teachers
are about 47 years old, have 22 years of teaching experience, and teach about 23 students in
a classroom.18
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of teacher characteristics by teacher gender for
both the full sample and the estimation sample. Teachers in the estimation sample have
characteristics similar to those of teachers in the full sample, except that teachers in the
full sample are slightly older and therefore have slightly more teaching experience. While
16In case of missing grades, typically an entire classroom was excluded from the sample because teachers
did not report grades for any student in the class. Because primary school lasts six years in Berlin, teacher
recommendations are not available for these students.
17Oﬃcial statistics from the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce show that in the school year 2000/2001 (the
school year of the PIRLS-E 2001 testing), 83.7 percent of primary school teachers were female in those
German states that are part of our sample (Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2002, p. 362). The diﬀerence of about
7 percentage points might be due to male teachers predominantly teaching primary school students in the
higher grade levels, for example, fourth-graders that were tested in PIRLS (unfortunately, we have no oﬃcial
data on that).
18Table A1 provides descriptive statistics of the full sample, which consists of all teachers who reported
their gender and all students with test scores in both reading and math. In contrast, the estimation sample
excludes all classrooms having diﬀerent teachers for German and math. Furthermore, students with missing
information on the school grade in German or math are excluded from the estimation sample. Average test
scores in reading and math are slightly lower in the full sample than in the estimation sample. All other
covariates are very similar in both samples.
10education level—which was reported only by teachers of German—is almost identical among
male teachers across the two samples, female teachers in the estimation sample, on average,
have slightly higher education levels. Comparisons between female and male teachers show
that female teachers are on average a bit younger and therefore have less teaching experience
than male teachers. Female teachers also have slightly fewer students in their classrooms.
5 Results
As a baseline, we ﬁrst present OLS regressions with pooled data across the two subjects
German and math, followed by the results of the correlated random eﬀects model. In Sec-
tion 5.2, we provide estimates of the incidence of relative grading using the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
models. Section 5.3 analyzes potential eﬀect heterogeneities.
5.1 Pooled OLS and Correlated Random Eﬀects Model
Table 3 presents the association between classmates’ average performance and own teacher-
assigned grade, using diﬀerent sets of control variables, in OLS models that pool the two
subjects German and math. As expected, a student’s grade is positively associated with
his or her classmates’ average performance if the student’s own performance is not taken
into account, indicating that the student belongs to a high-performing class (Column 1).
However, once the student’s own performance is accounted for, having better-performing
classmates is associated with a lower grade (Column 2). The next two columns reveal that
own grade and classmates’ average performance remain strongly negatively correlated when
numerous student-, teacher-, and class-level characteristics are added as controls. These OLS
results basically replicate the ﬁndings of existing studies (see Milek et al., 2009; Trautwein
and Baeriswyl, 2007). To eliminate potential biases that might arise from diﬀerences across
schools or from non-random sorting of students and teachers into schools, Column (6)
introduces school ﬁxed eﬀects thereby only using variation across classrooms within schools
for identiﬁcation. For comparison, we reestimate the speciﬁcation of Column (4) with a
sample that keeps only schools with more than one classroom (see Column 5). Comparing
Columns (5) and (6) shows that introducing school ﬁxed eﬀects does not change results.
In sum, given her own performance, a student’s grade is negatively associated with her
11classmates’ average performance, even if student and teacher characteristics are controlled
for. This negative association is in line with teachers grading relatively.19
As noted above, OLS models are likely to suﬀer from biases due to unobserved student or
teacher characteristics, or due to non-random sorting into classrooms within schools. Using
only within-student variation across subjects taught by the same teacher in a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
model eliminates any bias due to these sources. As discussed in Section 3, the validity of
the assumption underlying the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model can be tested. In the unrestricted
correlated random eﬀects model (see Equations (5) and (6)), we test whether the intensity
of relative grading is the same for both German and math (see Table 4). While the point
estimates on classmates’ average performance in the same subject (-0.267 and -0.149) diﬀer
across German and math (cf. Columns 1 and 2), this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The same is true for the estimates on classmates’ average performance in the other subject.
These results support the use of the restricted correlated random eﬀects model (cf.
Equations (7) and (8)). We can now estimate a single coeﬃcient on classmates’ performance
both in the same subject and in the other subject (Column 3). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
negative estimate of classmates’ average performance in the same subject and a coeﬃcient
close to zero of classmates’ average performance in the other subject. The coeﬃcient of
interest, ¯, is the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient on classmates’ average performance in
the same subject and the coeﬃcient on classmates’ average performance in the other subject.
This diﬀerence implies a statistically signiﬁcant estimate for ¯ of -0.226.20
The restricted model allows us to estimate the bias due to unobserved subject-invariant
student and teacher characteristics, which is represented by the coeﬃcient on classmates’
average performance in the other subject. The negative point estimate on classmates’
average performance in other subject of -0.060 in Column (3) suggests that the OLS models
might slightly, if at all, overestimate the true ¯. Note that the point estimate is not
even statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, potential biases in OLS models due to unobserved
school-, teacher-, and student-level characteristics or non-random sorting seem not to be an
19Given the ﬁndings of Table 3 and considering that secondary school recommendations are primarily based
on the average grade across the two subjects German and math, we should also observe that a teacher is
more likely to give a recommendation for high school, the lower the performance of a student’s classmates.
Indeed, Table A2 shows that the teacher recommendation for a student is negatively associated with his
or her classmates’ average performance (measured by PIRLS test scores), controlling for the student’s own
performance (test scores averaged across reading and math) and additional factors.
20The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model implies that subject-speciﬁc covariates have the same eﬀect on outcomes,
whereas they might have diﬀerent eﬀects in the unrestricted correlated random eﬀects model. This leads to
the small diﬀerence from the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced estimate in Column (2) of Table 5.
12issue. Surprisingly, factors such as within-school selection of teachers with diﬀerent grading
standards to classrooms seem to play only a minor role.
5.2 First-Diﬀerenced Model
The restricted correlated random eﬀects model is a special representation of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
model. Therefore, the implied ¯ in Column (3) of Table 4 should be similar to the coeﬃ-
cient in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model. This is indeed the case: the coeﬃcient on classmates’
average performance in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model fairly coincides with the implied ¯ of
the correlated random eﬀects model (see Column (2) in Table 5).21 The negative eﬀect of
classmates’ performance on own grade indicates that teachers grade a student’s performance
by comparing it with that of his or her classmates. The point estimate on classmates’ average
performance (-0.225) is one third smaller in magnitude than the respective OLS coeﬃcient
(cf. Column (2) in Table 3), indicating that the OLS model is biased by omitted variables.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model means that an increase in
classmates’ average performance by one standard deviation lowers a student’s own grade
by about 10 percent of a standard deviation (=coeﬃcient*SD classmates’ performance/SD
individual grade: -0.225*0.46/1=-0.104).
The last three columns in Table 5 investigate whether the negative eﬀect of classmates’
average performance on a student’s grade is driven by the student’s class participation. This
is a potentially important channel since class participation—along with the results of written
exams—might aﬀect the grade of a subject. Especially, better-performing classmates could
lower the grade of a student not only when the teacher grades on a curve, but also because
more able classmates might negatively aﬀect a student’s motivation to participate in class. A
student with top-performing classmates might participate less in class because her classmates
are rather active themselves and/or because she considers herself as less able. Thus, a
low-performing student might perceive herself as "a little ﬁsh in a big pond," a phenomenon
often analyzed in social sciences (see, for example, Gerlach et al., 2007). Therefore, we control
for students’ class participation with an index of subject-speciﬁc participation, computed as
the simple average of four survey questions that are identical for both German and math.
Speciﬁcally, students were asked to indicate how strongly they agreed with the following
statements: (1) "I usually participate intensively in class." (2) "I secretly often do other
21Results of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced model are identical if we instead pool the observations across the two
subjects and include student ﬁxed eﬀects (which implicitly implies including teacher ﬁxed eﬀects as well).
13things in class." (3) "In class, my thoughts are often somewhere else." (4) "I frequently raise
hands in class." Students could indicate whether they agreed with the statement completely,
almost, a little, or not at all. We coded as 1 the answer indicating the lowest participation
and 4 for the answer indicating the highest participation in class.22
Column (4) reveals that the negative association between a student’s grade and his or
her classmates’ average performance is not driven by the student’s class participation.23
As expected, stronger class participation is associated with a better grade, even when the
impact of individual and classmates’ performance is taken into account. However, including
a student’s class participation barely diminishes the eﬀect of classmates’ performance on
own grade. This indicates that having better-performing classmates leads to a lower grade
not because the classmates induce a student to lower her participation, but because teachers
compare students’ performance when assigning grades. Column (5) furthermore shows that
controlling for classmates’ average participation does not change the eﬀect of classmates’
performance either. This suggests that it is indeed the performance of classmates and not
their level of class participation that aﬀects a student’s grade. The last Column shows that
the coeﬃcient estimate on classmates’ average performance remains unchanged when we
control for both individual and classmates’ participation in class.
Instead of using classmates’ average performance, one may also consider alternative
measures of classmates’ performance. If teachers grade on a curve, they might, for example,
compare a student’s performance with the performance of the median student rather than
with an artiﬁcial average performance. Therefore, we reestimate all speciﬁcations with
classmates’ median performance and ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on classmates’ performance
barely change (see Table A3 in the appendix).
Another possibility is that teachers rank the performance of all students in a classroom
from best to worst and assign grades according to a student’s position in the performance
distribution. To investigate this possibility, we compute a student’s percentage rank in
the classroom’s test score distribution separately for reading and math, ranging from 0 (no
classmate performs better) to 1 (all classmates perform better). Column (4) in Table A4
shows that being the worst-performing instead of the best-performing student in class lowers
22Alternatively, we also counted how often a student indicated the highest participation in the four sub-
categories. The results do not change qualitatively.
23The sample size decreases by slightly more than half because the participation questions for math were
randomly asked of only half the students in each classroom and some students did not answer (while all
students were asked these questions for the subject German). The basic speciﬁcation for the smaller sample
(Column 3) shows that the coeﬃcient estimate on classmates’ average performance is slightly smaller than
with the full sample, but not statistically diﬀerent.
14the student’s grade by about half a standard deviation, even when own performance and
individual class participation are taken into account. This is a much larger eﬀect than the
respective point estimate in the speciﬁcation with classmates’ average performance (Table 5).
However, consider that moving from the very bottom to the very top of the performance
distribution equals about four standard deviations and recall that an increase in classmates’
average performance by about four standard deviations is associated with a lower grade by
40 percent of a standard deviation. This means that the magnitude of the eﬀect in a model
with performance rank (48 percent of a standard deviation) is quite similar to the eﬀect size
in a model with classmates’ average performance (40 percent of a standard deviation).
In sum, the results are very similar when we use alternative measures of classmates’
performance instead of classmates’ average performance. Therefore, we use only the average
test score as the measure for classmates’ performance in all subsequent analyses.24. We still
wait for information on the most common test statistic for the reliability ratio, Cronbach’s ®,
of the PIRLS-E German and math test to provide measurement-error corrected estimates.
Therefore, the coeﬃcient on classmates’ average performance in Column (2) of Table 5
remains our main eﬀect size. In order to get a ﬁrst idea of the magnitude of the measurement
error, we used the Cronbach’s ® from the German sample of the international PIRLS 2001
reading test for the reading and math test (see Mullis et al., 2003, p. 298, for Cronbach’s
alpha values of PIRLS 2001 reading tests). Using this imperfect estimate of the reliability
ratios, we ﬁnd that the measurement-error corrected eﬀect is about 50 percent higher than
the coeﬃcient on classmates’ average performance in Column (2) of Table 5.
5.3 Eﬀect Heterogeneity
To assess whether the intensity of relative grading diﬀers with teacher or class characteristics,
we add interaction terms between classmates’ average performance and various sub-group
indicators. As a reference point, Column (1) of Table 6 presents the basic ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
speciﬁcation of Table 5. Column (2) includes an interaction term between classmates’
average performance and a dummy for whether the teacher is female. The coeﬃcient on
the interaction term is large in magnitude and highly statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the
coeﬃcient on classmates’ average performance is not statistically diﬀerent from zero and even
24Classmates’ average test scores in math and reading are likely to be subject to measurement error that
attenuates the coeﬃcient of interest. The resulting bias can be consistently estimated with the reliability
ratio that indicates how much the true coeﬃcient ¯ of classmates’ average performance is asymptotically
attenuated due to classical measurement error in our explanatory variable (see Metzler and Woessmann,
2010)
15slightly positive.25 These results indicate that only female teachers grade on a curve, whereas
male teachers grade absolutely.26 In contrast to teacher gender, the intensity of relative
grading is independent of teacher experience (Columns 3) and class size (Columns 4). The
coeﬃcient estimates on these interaction terms are virtually zero, while the point estimates
on classmates’ average performance are negative and slightly larger in magnitude than in
the basic speciﬁcation without interaction terms.27
Work by Dee (2005, 2007) shows that the interaction between student’s gender and
teacher’s gender aﬀects not only student test scores but also teacher perceptions of student
performance. Therefore, we investigate whether teachers assign grades diﬀerently depending
on whether the student is of the same gender as the teacher or not. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction term between classmates’ average performance and a dummy variable indicating
that student and teacher are the same gender is slightly positive, but not statistically diﬀerent
from zero (Column 5). Thus, there is no evidence that the interaction between teacher gender
and student gender aﬀects the teacher’s grading scheme.28
Finally, we investigate whether relative grading is more relevant for the better-performing
or the worse-performing students. It might be that (female) teachers compare the perfor-
mance of the best students, but not of the worst students, when assigning grades. Alter-
natively, teachers might rather compare the performance of the weakest students. The ﬁrst
three columns of Table 7 present results for all classrooms; the last two columns contain
only classrooms with female teachers. Columns (2) and (4) include an interaction term
25The coeﬃcients hardly change when a dummy variable for female teacher is added to the speciﬁcation
to account for diﬀerences in grading standards across subjects. Given that female teachers, but not male
teachers, grade on a curve, we reestimate Table 5 and add interaction terms between all explanatory variables
and a binary indicator for female teacher. In line with Column (2) of Table 6, the interaction between female
teacher and classmates’ average performance is signiﬁcantly negative and reveals that only female teachers
grade on a curve. All other interaction terms are not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
26Since secondary school recommendations are strongly based on the grade point average in German and
math, diﬀerential grading schemes should also translate into diﬀerential relationships between a student’s
recommendation and her classmates’ performance. We test this hypothesis by re-estimating the speciﬁcations
of Table A2 separately for female and male teachers. Consistent with female teachers grading on a curve,
we ﬁnd that a student with a female teacher is less likely to receive a recommendation for high school if
she has better-performing classmates, given her own performance (Panel A of Table A5). And consistent
with male teachers grading absolutely, the likelihood of receiving a student’s high school recommendation
is not associated with her classmates’ performance in classes with male teachers, given the students’ own
performance (Panel B).
27The class size dummy equals 1 for classrooms with more than 23 students, about the mean class size, and
is 0 for smaller classrooms. Interacting classmates’ average performance with a discrete class size variable
instead of the binary dummy similarly yields a coeﬃcient very close to 0.
28We also experimented with including two additional interaction terms in all speciﬁcations of Table 6.
We interacted a dummy for female student with both the individual test score diﬀerence and with the
interaction term. All results remain qualitatively unchanged and neither of the two additional interaction
terms is statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation.
16between classmates’ average performance and an individual student’s average performance
across reading and math. The point estimates on these interaction terms are positive, but
not statistically diﬀerent from zero, indicating that the intensity of grading on a curve is
similar for weak and strong students. In Columns (3) and (5) we introduce interactions of
classmates’ average performance with a binary indicator for whether a student belongs to the
top 50 percent of the class. The positive, but imprecisely estimated coeﬃcients suggest that
relative grading might be weaker among the better-performing students. In sum, there is
small evidence that the intensity of relative grading diﬀers between well- and low-performing
students.
6 The Association between ‘Grading on a Curve’
and Students’ Learning Eﬀort
Theoretical work suggests that relative grading can negatively aﬀect students’ learning eﬀort.
In a relative grading system, classmates’ studying eﬀorts can have a detrimental eﬀect on
a student because rewards for learning (that is, grades) depend on a student’s rank in
class. Therefore, learning becomes a zero-sum game, which could lead to negative eﬀects on
students’ learning eﬀort because students might persuade each other "not to study too much"
(Bishop, 2006). Learning incentives might be lower in the presence of relative grading even if
students do not cooperate on eﬀort levels because incentives also depend on the random grade
component, that is, the performance uncertainty of students’ test scores in exams (Landeras,
2009). Performance uncertainty arises because a student never knows with certainty how
well he or she will perform on the exam, given her exam preparation. For example, the
student might feel ill on the day of testing or perhaps he or she did not prepare for the
exact questions asked. However, performance uncertainty could aﬀect all students in the
classroom. For example, noise in the classroom during the test might lower the performance
of all students alike. The uncertainty of outperforming a classmate (relative grading) is
therefore larger than the uncertainty of meeting a ﬁxed standard (absolute grading) when
the random component of test performance is mainly student-speciﬁc (and not class-speciﬁc).
This is the case since the performance uncertainty of two competing students adds up with
relative grading but not with absolute grading.
The previous section provides evidence that female teachers grade on a curve, whereas
male teachers use an absolute grading scheme (see Column (2) in Table 6). We exploit this
17gender diﬀerence in grading schemes to provide descriptive evidence that relative grading
does not lower students’ learning eﬀort. We use students’ class participation as a proxy
for general learning eﬀort, assuming that students who actively participate in class also
are more likely to do their homework properly and to prepare well for exams at home (see
p. 14 for questions on class participation). If relative grading leads to less learning eﬀort
than absolute grading, we should ﬁnd diﬀerences in students’ class participation between
classrooms with female teachers and those with male teachers. To this end, we use OLS
models with pooled data across all classrooms and across the two subjects German and
math.29 Column (1) of Table 8 shows that students with female teachers do not engage in
less class participation than students of male teachers. We interpret this as ﬁrst descriptive
evidence that relative grading by female teachers does not lower students’ learning eﬀort.
Adding a student’s grade as a control variable (Column 2) shows that, as expected, class
participation and grade are positively correlated. Furthermore, the insigniﬁcant interaction
term between student’s grade and female teacher indicates that the association between
participation and grade is independent of the teacher’s gender. Including further control
variables in the remaining speciﬁcations of Table 8 does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient of interest.
The coeﬃcient on the female teacher dummy always remains statistically insigniﬁcant and
close to zero.
If class participation was the same in classrooms with female and male teachers for
teachers with the same grading scheme, this ﬁnding suggests that students’ learning is not
aﬀected by relative grading. Of course, there might be other diﬀerences between female and
male teachers that could lead to diﬀerences in students’ participation. For example, students
might generally participate more in classes taught by men if male teachers are more able
than female teachers to elicit student eﬀort. In the presence of such gender-speciﬁc teacher
diﬀerences, the results of Table 8 tell us nothing about the eﬀects of the grading scheme on
students’ learning eﬀort.
In the remainder of this section, we investigate potential reasons for gender diﬀerences
in grading schemes. This also implies that we investigate whether there exist two important
gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences that could lead to diﬀerences in students’ learning eﬀort: whether
female and male teachers assess students’ performance diﬀerently and whether there are
gender-speciﬁc diﬀerences in teaching styles and subject motivation.
29We include only those students who provided information on class participation for both German and
math.
18Potential Reasons for Gender Diﬀerences in Grading Schemes
To better understand why male and female teachers use diﬀerent grading schemes, we
provide descriptive evidence on whether teachers assess students’ performance diﬀerently,
whether teaching style diﬀers, and whether female and male teachers are diﬀerently moti-
vated in their teaching of German and math. One reason for why grading schemes diﬀer
could be that female teachers use methods to assess student performance that are diﬀerent
from methods used by male teachers. For example, an absolute grading system may be more
likely if teachers use written exams instead of oral exams. Assessing performance on an
oral exam may be a more subjective process, making it more likely that a teacher (perhaps
unconsciously) compares one student’s performance with that of another. However, the ﬁrst
rows of Table 9 show that female and male teachers have a similar likelihood of assessing
students’ reading performance by means of an oral exam. Female and male teachers also
put similar emphasis on classroom tests and both often use multiple-choice tests to assess
students’ reading performance (not shown in table). This provides some evidence that female
and male teachers do not diﬀer in the way they assess students’ performance.
The remainder of Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of gender-speciﬁc teacher char-
acteristics that are not directly related to students’ grades, but do show that female and
male teachers are similar in several dimensions. First, female and male teachers have similar
styles of teaching reading. Most teachers of either gender always or often teach the whole
class together; most teachers, regardless of gender, very seldom, if ever, group students by
ability level. Second, female and male teachers report similar frequencies of teaching reading
per week, and the same percentage of teachers report that they usually spend more time
practicing reading with a student individually if the student is lagging behind his or her
classmates. Furthermore, students were asked to report the amount of time they usually
need to do their homework in German and math. Table 9 shows that students spend about
the same amount of time on German homework as they do on math homework, irrespective
of whether they are taught by a female or by a male teacher. These answers indicate that
female teachers put very similar emphasis on one subject than do their male counterparts
as measured by the time students spend studying at home.30
In sum, the descriptive statistics show that female and male teachers behave similarly
in several important dimensions. Therefore, these dimensions are unlikely to explain why
30While two out of three diﬀerences for time spent on German homework are statistically signiﬁcant, the
overall distribution is quite similar.
19female teachers grade on a curve, while male teachers use absolute grading schemes. Also,
the similarity suggests that students’ learning eﬀort should not diﬀer because female and
male teachers are diﬀerent with respect to these dimensions.
7 Conclusion
Understanding how teachers assign grades is important since school grades might aﬀect both
the educational career and the labor market entry. In the German tracked school system,
for example, the type of secondary school attended is strongly aﬀected by the grade point
average for the major subjects German and math achieved in primary school. Similarly,
a student’s GPA must often meet a certain threshold to progress to the next grade or to
graduate from school. Finally, theoretical studies show that the grading scheme might aﬀect
students’ learning eﬀort.
This paper investigates the empirical incidence of grading on a curve, using data on
fourth-grade students from the German extension of the Progress in International Reading
Literacy Study 2001. Our identiﬁcation strategy uses variation in students’ test scores
and teacher-assigned grades across the subjects German and math, along with variation
in classmates’ test scores across the two subjects. We identify the eﬀect of classmates’
performance on a student’s grade in a within-student across-subject model by diﬀerencing
grades and test scores across subjects and restricting the sample to classrooms in which
both subjects are taught by the same teacher. This approach likely eliminates biases due
to non-random sorting and omitted student as well as unobservable teacher traits, such as
teachers’ grading standards.
We ﬁnd that having classmates with one standard deviation higher average test scores
lowers a student’s grade by about 10 percent of a standard deviation. Further speciﬁcations
show that eﬀects are very similar when alternative measures for classmates’ performance,
such as the median value or a student’s position in the performance distribution of the
class, are used. We ﬁnd that only female teachers, but not male teachers grade on a curve.
Additional results suggest that the intensity of relative grading does not diﬀer between
high-performing and low-performing students and that relative grading does not depend on
teacher experience or class size. Exploiting the diﬀerence in grading schemes between female
and male teachers, we ﬁnd no association between relative grading and students’ learning
eﬀort. Future studies might try to provide more causally interpretable results of this link.
20Overall, the results indicate that grading schemes diﬀer between female and male teach-
ers. While a student’s grades—a potentially important academic outcome—depend only on
the student’s own performance when the student is taught by a male teacher, grades addition-
ally depend on the performance of classmates when the student is taught by a female teacher.
The diﬀerence in grading schemes across teacher gender remains a puzzle; understanding its
causes and potential consequences is an interesting topic for future research.
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24Tables
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics: Estimation Sample
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Individual school grades (reversed scale)
German (non-standardized) 4.21 0.93 1 6
Math (non-standardized) 4.30 0.98 1 6
German (z-standardized) 0 1 -3.45 1.93
Math (z-standardized) 0 1 -3.36 1.73
Diﬀerence (German-math) 0 0.83 -3.36 3.25
High school recommendation 0.36 0 1
Individual test scores
Reading (non-standardized) 545.21 65.07 263.78 728.33
Math (non-standardized) 506.93 96.79 181.54 806.12
Reading (z-standardized) 0 1 -4.33 2.81
Math (z-standardized) 0 1 -3.36 3.09
Diﬀerence (German-math) 0 0.90 -3.89 3.71
Classmates’ average test scores
Reading 0 0.45 -2.79 0.97
Math 0 0.48 -2.62 0.82
Diﬀerence (German-math) 0 0.31 -0.88 0.81
Individual participation in classa
German 3.12 0.62 1 4
Math 3.26 0.60 1 4
Diﬀerence (German-math) -0.14 0.46 -2.25 2.50
Classmates’ avg. participation in classa
German 3.12 0.18 2.63 3.72
Math 3.26 0.26 2.20 4.00
Diﬀerence (German-math) -0.14 0.20 -0.99 0.55
Student characteristics
Cognitive ability 0 1 -2.84 3.03
Age (in months) 125.9 5.6 102 159
Female 0.48 0 1
(continued on next page)Table 1 (continued)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Family background characteristics
School degree of father
ISCED 2 or lower 0.19 0 1
ISCED 3 or 4 0.09 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.12 0 1
School degree of mother
ISCED 2 or lower 0.20 0 1
ISCED 3 or 4 0.10 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.22 0 1
Annual household income (in $)
Less than 20.000 0.16 0 1
20.000-29.999 0.22 0 1
30.000-39.999 0.24 0 1
40.000-49.999 0.17 0 1
50.000-59.999 0.10 0 1
60.000 or more 0.11 0 1
Number of books at home
0-25 0.06 0 1
26-100 0.13 0 1
>100 0.37 0 1
Born in Germany
Student 0.79 0 1
Mother 0.80 0 1
Father 0.80 0 1
German spoken at home
Always or almost always 0.89 0 1
Sometimes 0.10 0 1
Never 0.01 0 1
(continued on next page)Table 1 (continued)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Variables at class level
Female teacher 0.77 0 1
Missing values 0 0 0
Teacher’s age (in years) 46.8 10.2 26 63
Missing values 0.01 0 1
Teacher’s education
ISCED 3 0.21 0 1
ISCED 4 0.02 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.71 0 1
Missing values 0.07 0 1
Teacher’s experience (in years) 21.5 12.1 1 42
Missing values 0.04 0 1




Students per class 19.8 4.9 8 31
Schools 81
Notes: Observations are weighted with the inverse of students’ sampling probabilities. Std. Dev.: Standard
deviations are reported only for continuous and discrete variables. Test scores are the ﬁrst plausible values of
the respective test domain. Classmates’ average test scores are simple averages of all individual test scores
in the class, excluding own test score. School grades were rescaled, ranging from 1 (fail) to 6 (very good).
Means and standard deviations of the following variables include imputed values: student/mother/father
born in Germany (5.8% missing values/7.7%/9.3%), mother’s education (36.2%), father’s education (37.9%),
number of books at home (9.5%), and household income (22.1%). The ISCED education levels combine
school, vocational, and university degrees. ISCED 2 or lower: not more than lower secondary education;
ISCED 3 and 4: upper secondary education and non-tertiary postsecondary education; ISCED 5 or higher:
tertiary education and higher.
a Since international PIRLS was designed to test students in reading, only half the students in each classroom
were asked to provide information on participation in math, whereas all students were asked to provide
information on participation in German.Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Teacher Characteristics
Female teachers Male teachers
Full Estimation Full Estimation
sample sample sample sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Teacher’s age (in years) 47.6 (9.4) 45.9 (10.7) 50.8 (8.1) 49.8 (7.9)
Missing values 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.000
Teacher’s education
ISCED 3 0.245 0.182 0.292 0.300
ISCED 4 0.014 0.020 0.000 0.000
ISCED 5 or higher 0.677 0.717 0.688 0.667
Missing values 0.059 0.081 0.021 0.033
Teacher’s experience (in years) 22.2 (11.7) 21.1 (12.7) 24.4 (9.9) 22.9 (9.9)
Missing values 0.035 0.040 0.016 0.033
Class size (reported by teacher) 22.6 (3.5) 22.6 (4.2) 23.2 (3.9) 23.7 (4.8)
Teachers 282 99 64 30
Classrooms 229 99 63 30
Students 4,369 1,920 1,270 630
Schools 141 67 55 24
Notes: Sample means reported; standard deviations of continuous variables in parentheses. The full sample
contains all students with test scores in reading and math and teachers with reported gender. The estimation
sample excludes students with missing information on the school grade in German or math and excludes
all classrooms in which the two subjects were taught by diﬀerent teachers. Teachers’ education level was

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Correlated Random Eﬀects Model
Dependent variable: German grade Math grade Grades
(1) (2) (3)
Classmates’ average performance in same subject –0.267** –0.149 –0.286***
(0.133) (0.128) (0.056)
Classmates’ average performance in other subject –0.038 –0.234 –0.060
(0.144) (0.154) (0.058)
Individual performance in same subject 0.371*** 0.283*** 0.356***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.013)
Individual performance in other subject 0.179*** 0.221*** 0.172***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.016)
Classrooms 129 129 129
Students 2,550 2,550 2,550
Chi-squared (coeﬀ. on same subject equal) 0.028
Prob>chi-squared 0.599




Dependent variables: grade in German (Column 1), grade in math (Column 2), and grade in German
and math (Column 3). Models (1) and (2) are estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). All
regressions control for student characteristics, family background, teacher characteristics, and class size.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the classroom level; standard errors are estimated

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Performance Assessment, Teaching Style, and Motivation by Teacher Gender
Female Male
Teacher questions teachers teachers Diﬀerence
Assess students’ reading performance orally
At least once a week 0.617 0.500 0.117 (0.106)
Once or twice a month 0.340 0.429 -0.088 (0.104)
Once or twice a year 0.043 0.071 -0.029 (0.047)
Teach reading the whole class together
Always or almost always 0.351 0.310 0.040 (0.101)
Often 0.412 0.483 -0.070 (0.105)
Sometimes 0.216 0.207 0.010 (0.088)
Never 0.021 0.000 0.021 (0.027)
Group students with similar abilities when
teach reading
Always or almost always 0.043 0.000 0.043 (0.038)
Often 0.202 0.207 -0.005 (0.086)
Sometimes 0.617 0.655 -0.038 (0.104)
Never 0.138 0.138 0.000 (0.074)
Teach reading
Every day 0.577 0.517 0.060 (0.106)
Three or four days a week 0.237 0.310 -0.073 (0.093)
Fewer than three days a week 0.186 0.172 0.013 (0.082)
Usually spend more time practicing reading
with a student individually if she lags behind 0.844 0.828 0.016 (0.078)
Teaching math generally means fun 0.889 0.833 0.056 (0.069)
Teaching math generally means interesting topics 0.670 0.767 -0.097 (0.097)
Student questions
Time usually needed for homework in German
15 minutes 0.531 0.596 -0.066 (0.023)
30 minutes 0.364 0.323 0.041 (0.022)
45 minutes or more 0.105 0.081 0.024 (0.014)
Time usually needed for homework in math
15 minutes 0.537 0.561 -0.023 (0.023)
30 minutes 0.338 0.325 0.014 (0.022)
45 minutes or more 0.124 0.115 0.010 (0.015)
Notes: Samples are the estimation samples which consist only of classrooms that are taught by the same
teacher in German and math. The sample size of female teachers varies between 94 and 99, and the male
teacher sample varies between 28 and 30. The last column reports diﬀerences between female and male
teachers, with standard errors in parentheses. The variables Teaching math generally means fun and Teaching
math generally means interesting topics equal 1 if the teacher answered "completely true" or "almost true"
and equal 0 for the answers "a little bit true" and "not true at all."Appendix
Table A1
Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Individual school grades (reversed scale)
German (z-standardized) 0 1 -3.57 1.89
German (non-standardized) 4.26 0.92 1 6
German missing 0.22 0 1
Math (z-standardized) 0 1 -3.42 1.78
Math (non-standardized) 4.28 0.97 1 6
Math missing 0.22 0 1
Diﬀerence (German-math) 0 0.87 -3.49 3.23
High school recommendation 0.36 0 1
High school recommendation missing 0.09 0 1
Individual test scores
Reading (z-standardized) 0 1 -4.18 2.89
Reading (non-standardized) 539.25 66.54 263.78 729.50
Math (z-standardized) 0 1 -5.37 3.54
Math (non-standardized) 500.47 99.95 -30.70 850.33
Diﬀerence (German-math) 0 0.96 -3.81 5.22
Individual participation in classa
German 3.11 0.61 1 4
Math 3.24 0.60 1 4
Diﬀerence (German-math) -0.14 0.47 -2.50 2.50
Classmates’ participation in classa
German 3.11 0.19 2.63 3.56
Math 3.23 0.26 2.27 3.88
Diﬀerence (German-math) -0.12 0.21 -0.75 0.65
Individual characteristics
Cognitive ability 0 1 -3.68 3.08
Age (in months) 126.4 6.0 102 159
Female 0.49 0 1
Family background characteristics
School degree of father
ISCED 2 or lower 0.22 0 1
ISCED 3 or 4 0.56 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.22 0 1
School degree of mother
ISCED 2 or lower 0.23 0 1
ISCED 3 or 4 0.63 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.14 0 1
Annual household income (in $)
Less than 20.000 0.17 0 1
20.000-29.999 0.21 0 1
30.000-39.999 0.24 0 1
40.000-49.999 0.16 0 1
50.000-59.999 0.10 0 1
60.000 or more 0.12 0 1
Number of books at home
0-25 0.20 0 1
26-100 0.36 0 1
>100 0.44 0 1
(continued on next page)Table A1 (continued)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Born in Germany
Student 0.79 0 1
Mother 0.80 0 1
Father 0.79 0 1
German spoken at home
Always or almost always 0.89 0 1
Sometimes 0.10 0 1
Never 0.01 0 1
Variables at class level
Female teacher 0.63 0 1
Missing values 0.25 0 1
Teacher’s Age (in years) 48.2 9.4 26 63
Missing values 0.12 0 1
Teacher’s education
ISCED 3 0.15 0 1
ISCED 4 0.00 0 1
ISCED 5 or higher 0.39 0 1
Missing values 0.45 0 1
Teacher’s experience (in years) 22.6 11.4 0 42
Missing values 0.14 0 1




Students per class 19.1 4.9 6 31
Schools 166
Notes: Observations are weighted with the inverse of students’ sampling probabilities. Std. Dev.: Standard
deviations are reported only for continuous and discrete variables. Test scores are the ﬁrst plausible values of
the respective test domain. Classmates’ average test scores are simple averages of all individual test scores
in the class, excluding own test score. School grades were rescaled, ranging from 1 (fail) to 6 (very good).
Means and standard deviations of the following variables include imputed values: student/mother/father
born in Germany, mother’s education, father’s education, number of books at home, and household income.
The ISCED education levels combine school, vocational, and university degrees. ISCED 2 or lower: not more
than lower secondary education; ISCED 3 and 4: upper secondary education and non-tertiary postsecondary
education; ISCED 5 or higher: tertiary education and higher.
a Since international PIRLS was designed to test students in reading, only half the students in each classroom
were asked to provide information on participation in math, whereas all students were asked to provide
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